* The first issue involves the relationship with place and geography as fundamental determinants of citizenship:
Mere descent from a geographical place does not necessarily entail gratitude of full citizenship. This «descendant» must contribute to the continuation of life of his/her homeland, by paying taxes and the performing duties to obtain rights.
Is an expatriate, for example, who has spent decades outside his country, paying taxes to another country, who has not contributed to the transformation of his country’s laws and the development of his society, and who does not bear the consequences of its economic difficulties or living conditions, entitled to decide the destiny of millions of citizens who residing in it and who bear all its pressures and daily difficulties by exercising his right to vote?
Is the blood line alone enough to determine whether a person fulfills all the conditions for citizenship?
This problem is reflected in the Lebanese electoral law. It is based on casting a vote based on the registry of vital records, and not based on the place of residence. Thus, a «citizen» who was born in Beirut, lives there, and pays the taxes owed to his/her municipality, must cast his vote in a village in another governorate for the sole reason that his vital records are kept there. Such a practice denies him/her the most important right of citizenship which is electoral accountability. Under such a law, he/she would not be able to hold the Beirut municipality accountable despite paying taxes and living within its scope.
On the other hand, what about people residing in the country who do not hold citizenship, even though they have been there for decades, such as the Palestinians, the Filipinos, the Indians, the Iraqis, the Syrians, the Ethiopians, the Egyptians, the Sri Lankans, etc.? They now have grandchildren born in this country who pay taxes, contribute to its economic and urban progress, and suffer the hardships of daily life and the dangers of internal and regional threats; do they not deserve citizenship?!
In short, how can people accept one another, and form civil and citizen relations under a political and societal system that promotes the opposite of citizenship, and even goes as far as to reward anti-citizenry conduct?
* The second issue revolves around belongings or «allegiances».
I have always wondered about the point of two bar associations, one in Beirut and the other one in Tripoli in the north. This applies to the orders of physicians and engineers as well. One of the reasons may be related to the legacy of the problematic creation of Greater Lebanon (as is the case with other Arab countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) at the hands of the French/British colonialist powers in the early 20th century.
In any case, belonging remains an essential element in strengthening or undermining Lebanon.
Most of Lebanon's primary historical references (Philip Hitti, Kamal Salibi, Jawad Boulos, Georges Corm, Ahmad Beydoun, etc.) agree that the religious sects/denominations form the basis for Lebanon’s modern political creation.
In terms of identity, the Lebanese oscillate between the different components of their individual belonging and the other collective belonging. Most of us find it very difficult to deal with this, especially since our upbringing does not help us see the complementarity between the different and sometimes contradictory elements. Instead, we are continuously brought up to seek to eliminate the multiple components of our identity in favor of one or two components at the most.
«[…] Is there a single Lebanese identity? Or are there contradictory identities that make coexistence among the Lebanese impossible?" (Corm).
«My identity is what prevents me from being identical to anybody else,» says Amin Maalouf in his book In the Name of Identity. On the same page, he goes on to say, «Each individual’s identity is made up of a number of elements, and these are clearly not restricted to the particulars set down in official records. Of course, for the great majority these factors include allegiance to a religious tradition; to a nationality-sometimes two; to a profession, an institution, or a particular social milieu. But the list is much longer than that; it is virtually unlimited.
A person may feel a more or less strong attachment to a province, a village, a neighbourhood, clan, a professional team or one connected with sport, a group of friends, a union, a company, a parish […].» [penguin]
«Of course, not all these allegiances are equally strong, at least at any given moment. But none is entirely insignificant, either. All are components of personality-we might almost call them ‘genes of the soul’ so long as we remember that most of them are not innate.»
This particular element, namely the primacy of this individual identity over the collective identity, is an essential element in the production of the citizen and citizenship crisis as experienced in Lebanon and in many other countries.
The affiliations that are reckoned to be of consequence in our daily lives are not always those that are considered major belongings such as language, color, ethnicity, class and/or religion.
The so-called «Lebanese individual» suffers from the conflict between these affiliations and their overlap, and we see this in the perception of relations between this "individual" and «every» other «Lebanese or non-Lebanese individual». There is the Sunni Lebanese whose belonging to Egypt or some Gulf state predominates as is the case with Iran for the Shiite, France for the Maronite and Russia for the Orthodox.
These issues are still relevant and active in the actual formation and practice of citizenship.
Given the above, how can these individuals, who are unable to establish healthy relationships among themselves, on the foundation of accepting differences and building on common interests and needs, establish healthy relations with «others»? The others in this case are the «Syrians», the «Palestinians», the «Iraqis», the «Egyptians», the «Indians», etc.
Proposals to strengthen the relationship between people in Lebanon on the basis of citizenship:
We have intentionally used «people» in the title to this section and not other words such as «Lebanese», «Indian», «Palestinian», etc.
The «anxieties» and the «fears» existing between the «Syrians», the «Lebanese» and the «Palestinians» cannot be considered in isolation from the anxieties and fears-which are almost identical-between the Lebanese themselves. These fears take many forms, including political, economic and even demographic.
An example stood out powerfully during the civil war (1975-90) (one of many wars; we are now experiencing one of them in a completely non-military forms). The «Maronite Lebanese from Achrafieh» may share the same condescending view as that of the «Lebanese Sunni from Beirut» of the «other Sunni Lebanese» and the «other Maronites from Akkar», for example. They, the Maronite Lebanese from Achrafieh and the Lebanese Sunni from Beirut, also lead an inferior/superior relationship between them!
This aspect of relationships between people has lately come to the foreground in two striking instances. The first was when the former Minister of Labor, Boutros Harb, called for banning the sale of land between the Lebanese sectarian communities, and the second following the proposal of an electoral law that provides that Christians vote for Christians and Muslims for Muslims, in other words undermining a basic condition of citizenship!
In such an institutional environment, and with such methodologies and policies, it will be very difficult for people of other nationalities to receive equal citizen or even humane treatment.
I do not think there could be effective measures in this regard without introducing institutional reforms-legal and legislative first-which would eliminate and punish all forms of discrimination between the Lebanese (based on religious sects first, then on the basis of economic class and profession). These should be accompanied by educational and tax reforms. With regard to public schools, the Lebanese and Syrian poor are equally underprivileged. They are also equally burdened with indirect taxes (which is unfair in the absence of progressive direct taxes and the absence of tax on economic rent).
As for the relationship between the Lebanese, the Palestinians and the Syrians, it is necessary to examine at least three factors that have contributed and continue to shape this relationship and determine its form, type and future character.
The first factor is the shock of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by virtue of which the British and French colonizers divided and shared the area. It coincided (i.e., this agreement and its consequences, the shock) with other contemporaneous shocks (the Balfour Declaration, the division of Syria and Iraq, and the Great Arab Revolt).
The second factor is collective memory-often negative-of the relationship between «Syria» and «Lebanon», which reached its climax in the Syrian army’s presence in Lebanon and in the wake of its withdrawal following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. In the past five years, the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, and the official and popular approach to dealing with it have compounded the problem.
In addition to this collective memory, there is also what relates to the Palestinian guerrilla movement, or Fedayeen, and the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon that started in the late 1960s and continues to this day (today confined within the limits of Palestinian refugee camps).
The third factor is the occupation of Palestine and the large numbers of its population coming as refugees to Lebanon in several waves (between 1948 and 1967), and the consequent political, economic, military, security, societal and demographic developments and complexities that have taken many forms since the end of the 1960s.
Finally, some proposals could work towards improving relations or at least preventing them from escalating into a larger crisis, both in the short and long terms, including:
Strengthening the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in Lebanon. I believe that this will have a positive impact on all the people living in this country.
Abolishing discriminatory policies, decisions and laws against: (a) Syrian refugees and Palestinians in Lebanon; (b) any person who lives on Lebanese territory of any nationality whatsoever.
Holding accountable all politicians and media professionals who incite publicly or implicitly against any nationality, and at least morally criminalize them. (Hate speech must be prevented and those who practice it must be held accountable).
Holding accountable municipalities that take illegal racist and discriminatory decisions against refugees (such as curfews), and not tolerate them.
Launching civil society initiatives (and supporting existing ones) to promote meetings and human interaction at all levels (technical, cultural, intellectual and professional) between the Syrian and Palestinian refugees, on the one hand, and the Lebanese, on the other.
Putting an end to practices that infringe refugee rights (such as arbitrary arrests, torture, humiliation and collective punishment), holding perpetrators accountable instead of cover-ups.
To conclude, a quotation for Saadallah Wannous’s Fragments of History seems apposite: «In this muddied reality and sickly age, accomplishing the possible may be the dream.»