Lebanon and the impact of three large- scale migrations

The historian Fawwaz Traboulsi believes that the three migrations have several things in common, from the question that is posed when the migration begins – where will these people live? – to the possibility of benefiting from them as a work force, as well as other aspects.
Armenian migration
«The Armenians first worked as tradesmen and laborers,» Traboulsi notes.
«There is no precise history of when the Armenian middle class arrived or took shape in Lebanon. The Armenians in Lebanon benefited from assistance provided by the Armenian Diaspora, which helped them assimilate, particularly in political life. After Independence in 1943 they had MPs and ministers and didn't only join Armenian political parties, but also Lebanese right-wing and left-wing parties. They lived here peacefully; they engaged in socio-economic cooperation with Lebanese migrants from the south and the Bekaa,» Traboulsi says.
Looking at this migration today, he continues, we find a «positive success.» The Armenians who arrived in the region before the declaration of Greater Lebanon (1920) played a role in industry in two important periods of the country's history.
The first was when Europe and its armies required civilian goods and products during World War II, and the second was during the Civil War, when the Armenian areas – and especially Burj Hammoud – turned into an industrial zone that exported to a number of countries in the world.
The same positive view is echoed by economic expert Elie Yachoui, who says «the lack of openness of Armenian society didn't prevent people from migrating to Lebanon and starting from scratch.»
«A small number of them came with money. A number of them were able to generate wealth by working in industry, commerce and banking. With the exception of the initial period, the Armenians weren't a burden on Lebanon, its state and its society. They took part in the prosperity after WW II, but the Civil War was very difficult for many of them, prompting them to emigrate. Their numbers dropped from 500,000 to 250,000,» he says.
The emergence of the «positive view» of the Armenian migration is echoed by former Bar Association president Shakib Qortbawi.
«The Armenian migration is different from the other two in legal terms,» he says. «The largest number of Armenians arrived in Lebanon during World War I, or before the establishment of Lebanese identity and citizenship. On Aug. 30, 1924, it was decided that every Ottoman residing in Lebanon would become Lebanese unless they chose another nationality. This means that the Armenians who were subjects of the Ottoman state received Lebanese citizenship legally when Greater Lebanon was born.»
Palestinian migration
Traboulsi argues that Palestinian refugees did not pose a socio-economic burden on Lebanon until the mid-1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and that «they didn't take part in the movements and struggles to achieve socio-economic demands.» Prior to this, i.e. before Palestinian guerrilla activity from Lebanese territory and the signing of the Cairo Accord in 1969 and the eruption of the Civil War, «most Palestinians worked in agriculture, construction and petty trades; only a few worked in education, industry, trade and banking. UNRWA was responsible inside the camps for relief and education.»
Qortbawi affirms that «the Palestinians did not come here to gain Lebanese citizenship,» while Traboulsi believes that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon did not pose a socio-economic danger to the country.
«The Palestinian presence might not have contributed to the explosion of the war (in 1975) if the two parties to the Lebanese conflict had been in political agreement,» he argues. «Kamal Jumblatt himself, the ally of the Palestinians, supported trading the armed Palestinian presence outside the camps for political reforms that would grant Muslims wider participation in the regime and the state. He didn't support the permanent settlement of Palestinians and most of them were Muslims, even though everyone knows that the naturalization of the Armenians, most of whom were Christian, tilted the sectarian balance in favor of the Christians.»
Yachoui believes that although the majority of Palestinians live in the 12 camps, «the drop in education levels for most of them, and the fact that they lacked skills that would allow them to work in mid-level professions, have posed a Lebanese-Palestinian socio-economic problem, especially since the majority of the educated and those with their private income have emigrated from Lebanon.»
Yachoui says that Syrian migration to Lebanon has involved two types of direct impact: «their use of (Lebanon's) infrastructure, and their competition with Lebanese labor and the related rise of unemployment for Lebanese.»
«There are 7 to 8 percent who are well-off and spend money in Lebanon (cost of living and education) but more than 90 percent are poor. I don't think the material assistance that reaches them from international organizations is sufficient.»
Traboulsi doesn't deny that Syrian refugees are «consuming infrastructure, despite the fact that (the level of this) is sometimes exaggerated.» He believes that another type of exaggeration has emerged, with the notion that «Lebanon has lost around $7 billion because of the Syrian refugees.»
«How can the World Bank make such an estimate, which is adopted by the Lebanese state, without estimating the gains?»
Lebanon, he adds, «has gained quite a bit of relief because of the (previous) competition from Syrian agricultural products. It has begun to import goods and export them to the Syrian market.»
As for the competition from cheap Syrian labor, he believes that «in the first place, this hurts the Syrian workers who were already here in Lebanon.»
Nonetheless, Yachoui and Traboulsi say that despite the emergency and on-going nature of Syrian migration, the phenomenon remains unclear and is colored by politics and interests.
Three migrations have taken place but the Lebanese have been tolerant of only one of them, that of the Armenians. One hundred years after it took place, the Lebanese view it positively; they have accepted that the refugees became part of their country and took its nationality. However, the Lebanese forget the second migration, of the Palestinians, and how the refugees are besieged in camps, with limited work opportunities. There are many reasons for this, from the fear of permanent settlement of Palestinians to the memories of the Palestinian role in igniting the Civil War in 1975, while we shouldn't forget that that the Arab-Israeli conflict has yet to end. This means that the Palestinians remain refugees and their fate is tied to the resolution of this conflict. The third migration, of the Syrians, has been the most dramatic of all of this movement in the direction of a small country with a complicated social make-up. As usual, the Lebanese have been divided in their reactions; some believe that their state is unable to regulate the arrival of refugees in the first place, with the Syrian tragedy set to continue - with no sign of when it will end, or when Syrians will be able to return to their country.