Just before its 100th anniversary, Lebanon sounded the alarm of social risk, as it was estimated that the percentage of those below the poverty line increased from 28 to 55%, and those below the extreme poverty line increased from 8 to 23% compared to 2019.[1] The unprecedented economic and banking crisis has affected an insecure social reality, with the deterioration of the Lebanese Pound exchange rate and the banks’ seizure of depositors funds, accompanied by the advent of the Coronavirus pandemic on February 2020, and the announcement of the general lockdown. Then came the Beirut Port massacre culminating a series of crises, and claiming massive losses of lives, property and infrastructure. While the rise in poverty rates has been exacerbated by the combination of all these factors, it is certain that the inequality in Lebanon is not a circumstantial result of recent events, but rather a manifestation of a socio-economic system based on the weakness and fragility of the social protection provided by the State, and the delegation of its central role to the private sector and the civil sector, from communities and parties. Successive crises have exposed the flaws and inequalities in a worn-out system, whether through years of health policies and public-sector neglect, or in terms of the “privatization” of social and health care, under a systemic weakening of the welfare state[2] at the expense of sectarian leadership through charitable and religious institutions. While the authorities were supposed to respond to exceptional crises through emerging and innovative plans, they did not benefit from the declaration of general mobilization to balance asymmetric and inequitable relations, but rather tended to secure immediate needs without any serious plans. This was particularly evident in light of the announcement of the state of emergency and the authorities' preoccupation with restricting freedoms and militarizing the crisis management, instead of dealing with the dire social situation and securing basic rights following the port massacre. However, the exceptional situation we are witnessing today, and the rapidly inflating reality of inequality and poverty can only be rectified by exceptional measures that derive from the concept of an "effective State". In fact, the general mobilization system (extended until the end of 2020) allows the State a range of measures that can be adopted to protect fundamental rights, from the right to food, housing and health, especially by providing basic materials, and controlling prices down to securing its hold on vital facilities (banks, hospitals, hotels), and their human resources to ensure the necessary measures of recovery from the multi-headed crisis.
Beyond general mobilization measures, the severity of the crisis and levels of inequality require a switch from real-time solutions and traditional approaches for tackling poverty, to a comprehensive societal reflection on the inequalities in the system. Lebanon is considered one of the countries with the highest levels of wealth distribution imbalance, with ESCWA figures for 2019 showing that only 10% of the Lebanese own 70.6% of the wealth. The “Gini” index, which measures wealth distribution disparity, stands at 81.9%, one of the highest in the world. Therefore, effective social policies cannot be envisaged unless they are based on bridging this gap and distributing wealth – and post-collapse losses – fairly. Today's talk of building a more just society cannot be acheived without considering the structural causes of inequality, most notably the control of monopolies over vital sectors (health, energy or oil derivatives, food), the absence of the State control and its role in protecting and securing fundamental rights, and the unfair tax policy based on more than 80% of indirect taxes burdening all citizens without distinction in their income levels. So addressing poverty inevitably goes through addressing its causes, most notably the structures that allow for the major concentration of wealth in Lebanon. Thus, the introduction of social policies to build a more just future must proceed from the principle of social solidarity as a central and fundamental principle of the new order. Perhaps even more important is the momentum we have seen in recent months in individual and community initiatives, based on solidarity among people, particularly with regard to volunteering and providing housing and food for those affected, which methods and spirit must be reflected structurally in the State, through future social and economic policies and future legislations. The adoption of this principle should be applied on two levels: First, in protecting incomes, and second, in reducing the living bill and burdens on the most vulnerable groups.
Accordingly, the principle of social solidarity must be introduced in the context of work relations, where the employee does not bear the burden of economic conditions alone. Article 50/F of the Labor Law has stated the conditions of dismissal from work for economic reasons, whereas it stipulated that the employer must notify the Ministry of Labor one month prior to the execution of the dismissal, under the penalty of considering the dismissal arbitrary. In such case, the Ministry of Labor must consult with the employer on how to complete the dismissal, and set up a program that takes into account the seniority of the institution’s employees, their specialization, family and social status. In doing so, the law established a central role for the Ministry of Labor in dismissal issues, especially collective ones, and granted it the opportunity to monitor how employment contracts are terminated in a manner that would enable it to activate the principle of solidarity between the employer and the employee.
In the same spirit, it is necessary to develop and expand existing safety nets, particularly the National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP), so that a larger segment of the population can benefit from it. It is also necessary to consider developing its listed services in a manner that would reduce the cost of living for the beneficiaries, by setting, for example, a plan to secure access to affordable housing, activating control over real estate speculation, investing in the infrastructure and the public transport network in particular, and monitoring the prices of basic commodities, particularly food and health, by combating the abolition of exclusive agencies and breaking monopoly on them (medicines, equipment, etc.). It also remains important to secure sustainable funding for this program in a way that ensures its continuity. In fact, such a sustainability cannot be secured without establishing a fair and targeted tax policy, with no room for expanding its scope here, but only to give some ideas, such as introducing a progressive tax on total income sources (including rents), introducing a tax on empty apartments that would encourage offering them at affordable prices, and activating the foundations of a "solidarity tax", that is, a tax imposed on wealthier population segments used in the fight against poverty.
There is no single solution to reduce inequality. However, it is well established that all plans remain theoretical unless there are political, labor and trade union organizations and social forces capable of carrying and demanding them, through a human rights discourse that revives the logic of the State, beyond immediate assistance narratives. In this context, it is worth noting the importance of the initiatives launched by many groups in networking among the people of the affected areas in Beirut and seeking to institutionalize the victims as a community pressure force. The last point, therefore, brings us back to the main approach towards a solution, namely, the need to build alliances and organizations based on a socio-political project, participatory organizations in which all age groups, regions and professions are represented.