That statistic was among the most important lines of attack and excuses in the battle to mobilize the masses and win over public opinion against the Syrian presence.
Several political factions exploited this statistic to ring alarm bells about Lebanese identity and its sectarian balance. Certain journalists went so far as to say that «there is one Syrian living on Lebanese territory for every Lebanese». Perhaps it was difficult during that period to emphasize the need to distinguish between the Syrian people and the regime, while attempting to verify this astronomical statistic, and to keep political exaggeration at bay regarding Syrian workers.
The matter was dropped from political discourse after the Syrian military’s withdrawal following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Then, the July 2006 war with Israel further pushed the Syrian residents of Lebanon away from the glare of public attention.
It was not to last. With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, the presence of Syrians in Lebanon leapt to the fore, and with urgency. Syrian refugees were arriving in Lebanon en masse, fleeing atrocities meted out by both the Syrian regime and the revolutionary army.
There are slightly more than one million Syrians registered as refugees in Lebanon, according to figures from the Lebanese government and various international organizations (such as the UNHCR, ESCWA, and UNDP). Other estimates put the total number of Syrians in the country at around 1.5 million. These are the numbers that circulate in reports by international organizations (such as the World Bank), in the hallways of the UN, and in meetings between representatives of the Lebanese government and international donors. They are meant to sound the alarm about «the disastrous situation» in Lebanon to attract aid to the country.
Now, everyone from UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, to High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres, to most international and Lebanese politicians agree that a quarter of Lebanon’s inhabitants are Syrian citizens.
The aim isn’t to cast doubt on the veracity of these figures, although it is important to note that there are no effective mechanisms to corroborate them. It is not just that the tallies of Syrians who enter the country and register with the UNHCR are imprecise, but the same can be said of the tallies of those departing to Turkey or Europe, or returning to Syria. Lebanon is the main point of crossing for refugees from regime areas traveling onwards, and many of them have no desire to remove their names from UNHCR’s records.
These statistics – with all their negative connotations relating to the welfare of Lebanon – have made it difficult to remove some of the adverse stereotypes tied to the presence of Syrians in Lebanon. In public debates, it is almost impossible today to bring up some of the positive consequences of the influx.
For example, it used to be that one of the pretexts for hostility towards Syrian workers was remittances – that they would spend little of their earnings here in Lebanon and send most back to their families. Now that whole families have moved to Lebanon, they are consuming and spending here. They are not just burdens on the economy.
In reality, the consequences of the presence of Syrians in Lebanon is far richer, greater, and more complicated than its portrayal in the politics of refugees and aid. The Syrian workforce is vital to Lebanese agricultural, industry, construction, and the service sectors. That was the case before the revolution; it is still the case now. Syrian workers benefit the Lebanese economy as much as they benefit from it.
There are Syrian capitalists who have made billions of dollars available to Lebanese banks and the economy. (It should be noted that the banks, unfortunately, are unwilling to release the precise figures.) There are tens of thousands of well-to-do Syrians who now live, spend and rent in Lebanon. New decrees permit General Security to grant yearly, renewable residency permits to Syrians provided they can demonstrate that they have over 40,000 USD in Lebanese currency deposited in local banks. Then, there are those Syrians whom the Tourism Ministry has labelled «forced tourists». They have salvaged Lebanon’s tourism industry – especially its hotels and restaurants – in the absence of affluent visitors from the Gulf over the past three years.
At the level of commerce and trade, Lebanon now exports oil, food, metals, and consumer goods to Damascus and regime-controlled areas, which have been cut off from all border crossings except those with Lebanon.
If it is true, as they say, that «one-quarter of Lebanon’s inhabitants are Syrians», then it is equally true that Lebanese civil society has shown a tremendous capacity to work with, support, and adjust to their presence. Lebanon has been able to shoulder many of their concerns and difficulties, while at the same time benefiting from their energy and potential. It is an affirmation of the deep-seated brotherly relations between Syrians and Lebanese, despite the usual political discourse.