To engage in a comparison, the metaphor of “host and guest” might be closer to the truth than the version prevalent in the media. It’s also more precise, if we consider the relationship from the standpoint of racist behavior, because the components of racist thought don’t exist between these two neighboring, intertwined countries. Thus, the narratives about the skin color, looks and smell of Syrian workers are actually a type of racism - borrowed from international methods of expressing anger - over the Syrian presence, and not a problem of contending identities. The relationship between host and guest usually begins in a friendly manner, but then becomes imbalanced when the visitor is forced to reside in another country and is unable to leave. The host becomes angry and is unable to either tolerate the burden posed by the guest, or eject him. Over the long term this relationship becomes one of the strong versus the weak, forced to live in the same place. The visitor may not rebel against his host; if he does, he becomes an occupier and the host will exploit his position to pressure the guest, using all possible means, in the hope that he will finally be rid of him.
However, we rarely deal with the other side of this relationship, leaving aside the duality of victim and aggressor. It’s true that the guests have adhered to the protocol of their hosts tolerated insults in order to survive, after having fled the violence raging daily in their country. However, these people coming from the bigger country to the smaller one bring with them a version of Lebanon and its people that also lacks credibility, one in which generalizations, racism and superficiality prevail at times. The point here is not to conclude that counter-racism exists, but rather to unlock the ambiguity surrounding this problem that appears in the media - where Lebanese are in essence evil and Syrians are in essence innocent, and that behavior is based on differences in “identity” between the people of the two countries.
The version that many Syrians used to have about Lebanon and the Lebanese prior to the Syrian revolution hasn’t seen a big change, except that it remains hidden because of the current conditions. However, its content is the authentic Baathist version, namely that the Lebanese are superficial, sectarian and agents of the west. Serving as more than a mere mistaken generalization, this view in fact lays the groundwork for violence and opening up Lebanon and its people to interventions by outsiders. This is especially when racist, thuggish behavior enhances the belief that Lebanese, because of their nature as agents of foreign countries, their limp dialect, and their attention to the pettiness of the west, can only be brought into line by Syrian military force. In fact, many Lebanese were previously mocked about their dialect and their young people’s “western” appearance during the days of the Assad occupation. And more recently, it seems there are pro-regime and anti-regime Syrians who long for a return of this occupation.
Many Syrians who have sought refuge in Lebanon have yet to alter this condescending view, which sees the country as marginal and vapid. Some of them have sought to cement this description as if it were an unchangeable reality, just like the Assad regime’s long presence in Lebanon. These factors, along with the anti-refugee discourse, don’t do much to help Syrians understand Lebanon’s complex and diverse society. On the contrary, these versions have made it more difficult for them to adjust to their new country, which differs in its openness to the west and the unaccustomed to margin of freedom for those coming from Assad’s Syria. Both parties to the relationship exhibit mutual ignorance and engage in hateful clichés and stereotypes. Lebanese and Syrians haven’t been given the opportunity to get to know each other, unless it has been under exceptional circumstances. The Assad occupation of Lebanon presented Syrians as thieving soldiers, while the Baathist ideology cemented Lebanon as a place that is weak and open to outside intervention. The Syrian uprising hasn’t presented a new Syrian vision of Lebanon and the right-wing political and media machine in Lebanon hasn’t stopped for a moment in generating hateful rhetoric. Both versions have yet to be treated, or overcome; a long history poses a heavy burden for both peoples.
If the Syrian regime is the most important author of this history, will the end of this regime open up a new door for allowing Lebanese and Syrians to get to know each other?